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ABSTRACT
OBOECT PERMAMNCE MTO KNOWLEDGE OF NUMBER IN 5.5- AND 10-
MONTH
-OLD INFANTS
FEBRUARY 1996
JEANNE L. SHINSKEY, B.A.
, PROVIDENCE COLLEGE
M.S., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Richard S. Bogartz
The study attempts to replicate and extend the findings
of Xu and Carey's (in press) Experiment 1, which concluded
that 10-month-old infants use spatiotemporal information to
infer the number of objects involved in an occlusion event.
Two groups of eight infants each (four 5.5 and four 10 months
old) saw Xu and Carey's events involving either one
(continuous-screen condition) or two (discontinuous-screen
condition) inferred objects. Looking times to one and two
objects on subsequent test trials were recorded. The
remaining two groups of infants saw events that were
perceptually similar to Xu and Carey's (continuous-periphery
and discontinuous
-periphery conditions), with the exception
that the outcome of either one or two objects on the test
trials was impossible. The cognitive processing hypothesis
predicts replication of Xu and Carey's results for the first
two groups of infants: infants should look longer at one
object following familiarization to the event with two
inferred objects, and longer at two objects following
familiarization to the event with one inferred object. The
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cognitive hypothesis further predicts that infants in the
second two groups should look equally long at the unlikely
outcomes of either one or two objects. However, the
perceptual processing hypothesis predicts that infants should
Show the same pattern of looking at one and two objects in
all four groups: infants should look longer at two objects in
the continuous-screen and continuous-periphery groups, and
longer at one object in the discontinuous-screen and
discontinuous-periphery groups, xu and Carey's results were
not replicated: infants did not look longer at the unlikely
outcomes following familiarization events. Thus the
cognitive hypothesis is not supported by this study. The
perceptual processing hypothesis fared somewhat better in
that more of its predictions were confirmed, although not all
were, in addition, lack of replication of the two original
conditions has made interpretation of the results somewhat
difficult. Further studies, using a different design, may
better differentiate between the two hypotheses, but for now,
we do not believe the available evidence strongly supports
cognitive processing of occluded objects in young infants.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Object Permanence According to P^aq<^^-
Because this study investigates object permanence in
infants, and because Piaget was one of the first researchers
to empirically investigate object permanence in infancy, a
brief summary of the Piagetian view of object permanence is
necessary. According to Piaget (1952, 1954), attainment of
the object concept is one of the most important achievements
of the sensorimotor period of development. An infant who has
the object concept knows that objects continue to exist even
when they are not in view. The object concept is important
because it is evidence that infants can mentally represent
events, and mental representations subserve most, if not all,
aspects of cognitive development.
In the Piagetian model (1952, 1954), knowledge of the
permanence of objects is acquired gradually. The young
infant has no conception that objects exist separately and
independently from the infant's actions upon them. Objects
are the extensions of the infant's specific actions, and the
infant engages in action to produce the object, when the
object disappears, the infant briefly continues to perform
the same action in expectation of reproducing the object. If
this behavior fails to produce the desired outcome, the
infant ceases to repeat it, and does not try to engage in
alternative behaviors. For the infant, it is as if the object
is created and destroyed with each appearance and occlusion.
From 4 to 8 months of age, the infant will search for objects
that are partially occluded or that have dropped out of
sight. It is not until about 8 months of age that the infant
will engage in new behaviors, search behaviors, to try to
recover an object. According to Piaget, the infant begins to
conceive of the object as existing apart from the infant's
own specific actions between 8 and 12 months of age. The
object has a separate and independent existence that, when
hidden, can be uncovered by many different behaviors.
Infants' acquisition of the object concept also extends
beyond the search for completely hidden objects at 8 to 12
months of age. Between 12 and 18 months of age, infants
acquire the ability to successfully perform visible
displacement tasks, in which the object is moved, in view of
the infant, from one location to another. Between 18 and 24
months of age, infants can perform invisible displacement
tasks, in which the object is moved out of sight of the
infant from one location to another.
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Evidence for Oh^^.r.i- Permanfinnp
Piagef
s conclusions were based on tasks in which
infants manually searched for hidden objects, other
researchers have suggested that younger infants may fail to
search for hidden objects because they have difficulty
performing coordinated actions, not because they lack
knowledge of object permanence (e.g., Baillargeon, Spelke, &
Wasserman, 1985). Manual search tasks are not well-suited
for exploring object permanence knowledge in younger infants.
More recent methodologies have been used to investigate
object permanence knowledge in young infants. For example,
Baillargeon, Spelke, and their colleagues have undertaken
several studies using a visual habituation-dishabituation
paradigm to determine whether knowledge of object permanence
exists in younger infants (e.g., Baillargeon, Spelke &
Wasserman, 1985; Baillargeon & DeVos, 1991; Baillargeon 6k
Graber, 1987; Baillargeon, 1987b). In these studies, infants
are visually habituated to an event, using a standard
looking-time criterion. Dishabituation to a test event
occurs when infants perceive the event as novel, or according
to some researchers, impossible.
The following studies are discussed here because they
all conclude that object permanence knowledge is present in
infants younger than 8 to 12 months, contrary to what Piaget
concluded. These studies provide an important foundation
upon which the present experiment is based. Collectively,
they conclude that young infants engage in cognitive
processing of occluded objects. Not only are we unconvinced
that these conclusions are true, we also have found that many
subsequent studies, particularly those investigating infants'
knowledge of number, use methodologies based on the
assumption of object permanence knowledge in young infants.
It is therefore important to detail how these studies are
carried out, as well as to point out how pervasive these
conclusions are in the recent literature on infants'
processing of occluded objects.
Many of these studies were carried out by Spelke,
Baillargeon and their colleagues. For example, Baillargeon
and Graber (1987) presented 5.5-month-old infants with
possible and impossible test events following habituation to
a toy rabbit moving across a stage and behind a screen, in
the impossible event, a tall rabbit traveled behind a screen
with a window in it and did not show up in the window, in
the possible event, a short rabbit traveled behind the screen
and did not appear in the window, as it was not tall enough
to do so. Infants looked longer at the impossible than at
the possible event. Baillargeon and Graber concluded that
the infants believed that the hidden rabbit continued to
exist, and maintained its height and trajectory while hidden.
The infants expected the tall rabbit to show up in the
window, and were surprised when it did not. Baillargeon and
DeVos (1991) found similar results in a study with 3.5-month-
old infants, and concluded that young infants know that
Objects cannot exist at two points in time without existing
in between, cannot appear in two places without traveling a
continuous path in between, and cannot move through the space
occupied by other objects. However, Bogartz, Shinskey, and
speaker (1995) found different results using the same stimuli
and similar possible and impossible events as Baillargeon and
Graber, but in a mixed-model design, infants were
familiarized on one of the three types of events (original
familiarization, impossible event, and possible event), and
then tested with all three events. A multiple regression
analysis revealed that impossibility and possibility were not
factors affecting looking time, infants looked longer at
test trial events because they had features that were
different from the familiarization event, regardless of the
possibility factor.
In a now classic study of object permanence in young
infants, Baillargeon, Spelke, and Wasserman (1985) habituated
5-month-old infants to a rotating screen moving in a 180-
degree arc. After infants reached habituation, a box was
placed behind the screen. Infants were then presented with
either a possible event, in which the screen stopped moving
when it reached the hidden box, or an impossible event, in
which the screen continued to rotate through 180 degrees, as
if the box had disappeared. Infants looked longer at the
impossible event than at the possible event. Baillargeon et
al. concluded that the infants knew the box continued to
exist behind the screen, expected the screen to stop moving
When it reached the hidden box, and were surprised when this
expectation was violated, m variations of this study,
Baillargeon found similar results with 7-month-old infants
(1987a) and with 3.5- to 4
.5-month-old infants (1987b).
However, an alternative view predicts that a mixed-model
design using the same stimuli and events will show that
looking time is dependent not on the possibility or
impossibility of the events, but on the featural differences
between habituation and test events (Bogartz et al., 1995).
Many more studies of this type have been carried out in
the last decade (see, for example, Spelke, Breinlinger,
Macomber & Jacobson, 1992). These studies almost unanimously
conclude that young infants represent and reason about
occluded objects in much the same was as adults. As will be
seen in the following section, many recent studies of
infants' knowledge of number also assume cognitive processing
of occluded objects in infancy.
Object Permanence and Knowledge of Number
The assumption that young infants have acquired the
object concept is a crucial one for the paradigms used by
Wynn (1992a), Uller (1993) and Spelke and Kestenbaum (as
cited in Xu & Carey, in press) in their investigations of
infants' knowledge of number. Wynn (1992a) used a looking-
time procedure with occluded objects in her study of addition
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and subtraction in 5-rnonth-old infants. Wynn's procedure
as follows, infants were shown an empty stage. An object
was introduced onto the stage, and a screen was raised to
occlude the object, a second object was placed on the stage
behind the raised screen, infants saw the object briefly
before it was occluded, m the impossible test event, the
screen was removed and one object was revealed, m the
possible test event, two objects were revealed, infants
looked longer at the impossible than at the possible event.
Corresponding results were found with infants in the
subtraction group. Two objects on a stage were occluded by a
screen. One object was removed from behind the screen, in
view of the infant. The screen was lowered to reveal two
objects in the impossible event and one object in the
possible event, infants looked longer at the impossible
event. Wynn concluded that infants have true numerical
concepts, and further suggested that these abilities are
innate
.
Uller (1993) used 7- to 8-month-old infants to replicate
Wynn's (1992a) results in the addition event. She also added
another condition that was a variation on Wynn's experiment.
Wynn showed infants the first object on the stage before
raising the screen and adding the second object, uller
first raised the screen on the empty stage, then placed the
first object behind it, followed by the second object.
However, Uller 's 7- to 8-month-old infants did not look
differentially to one versus two objects. When Uller used 9-
to 10-month-old infants in the screen-first condition, she
found that the infants looked longer at one than two objects.
This finding suggests that knowledge of object permanence and
number are still undergoing significant development between 7
and 10 months of age. Uller and her colleagues are presently
investigating whether using two screens instead of one will
provide infants with spatiotemporal information that may aid
them in this task (C. Uller and S. Carey, personal
communication, October 1, 1994).
Spelke and Kestenbaum (as cited in Xu & Carey, in press)
conducted an experiment using occluded objects to determine
whether 4- to 5-month-old infants could use spatiotemporal
information to infer the number of objects involved in an
event. Infants were shown two screens on a stage (see Figure
1 on the next page for a similar design) . Infants were
habituated to an event in which one object emerged from
behind the left screen, traveled to the left, and then
returned to its position behind the left screen, followed by
an object that emerged from behind the right screen, traveled
to the right, and then returned to its position behind the
right screen again. No object appeared in the space between
the two screens. Following habituation, infants were
presented with what the authors refer to as an expected or
unexpected outcome. In the expected outcome test trial, the
screens were removed to reveal two objects. In the
unexpected outcome test trial, only one object was revealed.
Adults express surprise at the unexpected outcome, and Spelke
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1. Object 1
emerges
2. Object 1
returns
3. Object 2
emerges
4. Object 2
returns
5 . Likely
outcome
or
unlikely
outcome
Figure 1. Schematic representation of the discontinuous-
screen condition.
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and Kestenbaum found that infants looked longer at the
unexpected outcome than at the expected outcome. Spelke and
Kestenbaum concluded that the infants analyzed the possible
paths between the objects and, failing to see any object
travel between the two locations, inferred that there must be
two Objects. According to the authors, the presence of only
one object in the test trial violated the infants •
expectations and was manifested by longer looking.
in addition to the discontinuous condition described
above, which will be called the discontinuous-screen
condition from here on, Spelke and Kestenbaum' s experiment
(as cited in Xu & Carey, in press) also included a
continuous-screen condition, in which one object traveled
back and forth across the stage, appearing in the space
between the two screens (see Figure 2 on the next page for a
similar design). Infants in this condition were given the
same test trials as in the discontinuous-screen condition,
displaying either one or two objects. Infants did not look
significantly longer at one outcome than the other. While it
is possible that more than one object could be involved in
the continuous-screen condition, most adults interpret the
event as involving only one object. Two objects are
unexpected. If infants have the same object-concept
knowledge as adults, they should look longer at two objects
than one.
10
1. Object
emerges
2. Object
crosses
stage 4
times
3. Object
returns
4. Likely
outcome
or
unlikely
outcome
Figure 2. Schematic representation of the continuous-
screen condition.
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xu and Carey (in press) conducted an experiment similar
to that Of spelke and Kestenbaum (as cited in Xu & Carey, in
press), with some modifications. Participants were 10-month-
Old infants, with whom Xu and Carey did not find it necessary
to use a full habituation paradigm, xu and Carey reasoned
that if infants can use spatiotemporal information in an
adult-like manner, they should be able to infer the number of
objects involved in the event without full habituation. Xu
and Carey fixed the number of familiarization trials at four.
They also did not find it necessary to use objects that were
continuously in motion, although Spelke and Kestenbaum did.
Ten-month-old infants were able to sustain attention even
when the objects were stationary part of the time.
Xu and Carey found that 10-month-old infants looked
longer at one object in the discontinuous-screen condition.
Infants also looked longer at two objects in the continuous-
screen condition, but this effect was only marginally
significant. Xu and Carey's conclusions were that the
infants interpreted the discontinuous
-screen event as
involving two objects. The infants used the spatiotemporal
information to establish the number of objects and to track
the objects over time. The authors also conclude that most
of the infants assumed that only one object was involved in
the continuous-screen event, in accord with adults'
interpretations. Finally, Xu and Carey conclude that 10-
month-old infants ' ability to use spatiotemporal information
to establish the number of objects in an event is robust.
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These studies are all based on the assumption that the
infants have object permanence knowledge. The studies are
important here because the present experiment also
investigates infants • knowledge of object permanence and
nu,*er. Specifically, the goal of the present experiment is
to replicate the results of Xu and Careys study, and to test
the hypothesis that the results may be better explained by
lower-level perceptual processing rather than by cognitive
processing such as reasoning.
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CHAPTER II
THE EXPERIMENT AND ITS PREDICTIONS
The present experiment was designed with several goals
in mind. The first goal was to replicate the findings of Xu
and Carey (in press) with 10-month-old infants, a second
goal was to determine whether the same pattern of results
would be found with younger infants, at 5.5 months of age.
The findings of Spelke and Kestenbaum (as cited in Xu &
Carey, in press) suggested that differential looking might be
found for the discontinuous-screen condition, but not for the
continuous-screen condition. However, since the full
habituation paradigm used by Spelke and Kestenbaum was not
used here, it was worth investigating whether 5 . 5-month-old
infants would perform as well as 10-month-old infants with a
fixed number of trials, if the understanding is adult-like,
or even perhaps innate, there should be little difference
between 5.5- and 10-month-old infants. Results which do not
replicate with 5. 5-month-old infants may suggest that, if
infants do have a robust understanding of number at 10 months
of age, it is an understanding that undergoes significant
development between 5.5 and 10 months of age. Such results
would suggest that knowledge of object permanence and of
number is not innate, but develops rapidly in the first year
14
Of life, or else cannot be measured at 5.5 months in the same
way as at 10 months of age.
Another goal was investigated by presenting infants with
a variation of the conditions used by Spelke and Kestenbaum
(as cited in Xu & Carey, in press) and by Xu and Carey (in
press). It is possible that infants may look longer at
"unexpected" outcomes for reasons other than that they have
inferred the correct number of objects. One alternative and
more parsimonious interpretation is that the results may be
due to lower-level perceptual processing rather than to
higher-level cognitive functioning, it may not be necessary
for infants to draw inferences about objects and their
properties in order for them to look longer at what an adult
would consider an unexpected outcome. Longer looking times
may not reveal anything about inferences on the part of the
infant.
The perceptual processing perspective maintains that
young infants do not have innate or acquired knowledge of
object permanence or of number, and that young infants do not
use higher-level cognitive processes such as inferring or
reasoning about the properties of objects. The assumption is
that the young infant has no representation of an object
while it is occluded, since the infant cannot see and has not
seen the object while it is occluded, and does not yet have
the ability to infer the object's possible location.
Consider the discontinuous-screen condition used by
Spelke and Kestenbaum (as cited in Xu & Carey, in press) and
15
in mind.
by xu and Carey (in press), with this interpretation
The discontinuous condition involves attending back and forth
to two separate bundles of activity, it is possible that the
infant's representation of this event does not include the
information that there is a space between the screens through
which Objects could travel, since during the actual
familiarization trials the infant's attention is not
attracted to the center of the stage, it is also possible
that the motor behavior of turning the head and looking back
and forth is establishing a sense of "twoness", such that the
presentation of one object in the test trials is contrasting
enough to hold the infant's attention longer. This
interpretation does not require the infant to infer that it
is logically impossible for there to have been only one
object on the stage. The same interpretation can be applied
to the findings for the continuous condition. The smoother
visual tracking of the object in this condition can lead to a
perception of "oneness", such that the presentation of two
objects in the test trials is novel and more interesting,
without requiring expectation or knowledge of number.
Infants may also look longer at two objects in the continuous
condition because they do not expect to see an object in the
left location when they last saw an object on the right side
of the stage and vice versa.
The remaining two conditions of the present experiment
were designed with the perceptual processing perspective in
mind. The apparatus was the same as for the first two
16
conditions, and the infants were presented with continuous
and discontinuous conditions. The only difference is that
the Objects did not start and finish behind the screens, but
Off the stage. For each familiarization trial, the objects
were occluded by being off the stage. They came in towards
the center of the stage and were occluded temporarily by the
screens, and they exited again off to the sides of the stage
(see Figures 3 and 4 on the following pages). These two
conditions are referred to as the continuous-periphery and
discontinuous
-periphery conditions
.
Since no object ever ended up behind the screens at the
end of a familiarization trial, no object should be behind
the screens when they are removed. However, when the screens
were removed, either one or two objects were revealed.
Adults would express surprise at either outcome, infants
with object permanence knowledge should look longer on the
average in the periphery conditions, since the presence of
either one or two objects should be unexpected, if infants
do have an understanding of object properties and of number,
it might be expected that the looking times to one and two
objects in the periphery conditions would not differ
significantly. (The experiment included a test for a
baseline tendency to look differentially at one versus two
objects.) If infants do not have a full understanding of
object properties and number, the same results could be
obtained as were obtained by Xu and Carey (in press).
Infants could look longer at one object in the discontinuous-
17
periphery condition and at two objects in the continuous-
periphery condition, because of so»e lower-level, perceptual
processing explanation or novelty effect. Another
possibility is that the results may indicate that 10-.onth-
old infants have a fuller understanding of objects than 5.5-
month-old infants. Such results would lend support to the
hypothesis that knowledge of objects and physical laws may
not be present at birth, but develops rapidly early in life.
18
Object 1
emerges
Object 1
returns
Object 2
emerges
4. Object 2
returns
5. Either
outcome
imlikely
Figure 3. Schematic representation of the discontinuous-
periphery condition.
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1. Object
emerges;
crosses
stage 4
times
2. Object
returns
3. Either
outcome
unlikely
Figure 4. Schematic representation of the continuous-
periphery condition.
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CHAPTER III
METHOD
Participan-hg
Forty full-term infants participated in the study.
Twenty infants (13 female, 7 male) ranged in age from 5
months 5 days to 6 months 9 days, with a mean of 5 months 21
days, and 20 infants (13 female, 7 male) ranged in age from 9
months 24 days to 10 months 20 days, with a mean of 10 months
4 days. Eight infants participated in a baseline condition,
and eight participated in each of the four experimental
conditions, in each condition, half of the infants were 5.5
months old and half were 10 months old. Six additional
infants were excluded from the sample because of fussiness,
and one because of experimenter error. Participants were
recruited from published birth announcements through a letter
and subsequent telephone call to parents. Participants
received a toy and a certificate of appreciation for
participating
.
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Materials
Four identical pink toy pigs were used in the
familiarization and test trials. The objects were about 8 x
7.5 X 6.5 cm in size. Yellow posterboard was attached to two
masonite screens which were about 11.5 x 25.5 cm in size.
Apparatus
Testing took place in a brightly lit experimental room
(300 X 225 cm). A wooden stage (203 x 141 x 70 cm) was
located in the center of the room. Two black curtains (180 x
95 cm) hung from the sides of the stage to the wall behind
the infant in order to isolate the infant and parent from the
rest of the experimental room. A black cloth hung parallel
to the back of the stage, making the depth of the stage 39
cm. A shorter black cloth divider (100 x 21 cm) hung between
the black cloth wall and the front of the stage, making the
portion of the stage floor visible to the infant 25 cm in
depth. Infants viewed the events through an opening (37 x 63
cm) in the front of the stage.
All parts of the stage visible to the infant were
covered with black cloth in order to minimize distraction. A
narrow groove (86.5 x 1 cm) running parallel to the back wall
of the stage was located in the floor of the stage. Four
additional grooves (19 x 1 cm) ran perpendicular to the main
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groove, one behind each screen and one at each end of the
stage. The objects traveled along these grooves. The
Objects were attached to wooden dowels (57 x 1 c.) that were
operated from under the floor of the stage by the
experimenter. The screens were two vertical masonite boards
(11.5 X 25.5 cm), covered with yellow posterboard and
positioned 11 cm apart from each other in the center of the
stage. The masonite boards were glued at the top and bottom
to horizontal black masonite boards (36 x 11.5 cm) to
stabilize the movement of the two screens as they were raised
and lowered by a pulley system operated by the experimenter
from behind the stage.
Two video cameras were mounted in the room in order to
record the infant's face and the events on the stage. The
camera focusing on the infant's face was positioned centered
behind the black cloth wall of the back of the stage (36 cm
above the floor), so that only the lens was visible to the
infant. The camera focusing on the stage was positioned
above and behind the infant. The video monitor for the
camera focusing on the infant's face was used by the observer
from a separate room. Looking times were recorded online
using a keyboard interface to a Macintosh SE/30 computer
operated by the observer.
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Procediirp
For all five groups (four experimental plus baseline),
the infant was seated in an infant car seat secured to a
chair. The infant's face was about 45 cm from the stage, and
eye level was about 18 cm above the floor of the stage. The
parent was seated next to the infant, but with his or her
back to the stage. The parent was instructed not to look at
the displays, so as not to influence the infant's behavior,
and not to interact with the infant unless the infant became
too fussy to continue the experiment.
Experimental Groups
For each of the four experimental conditions, the
familiarization trials began with the stage empty. The
experimenter drew the infant's attention to the empty stage
by tapping the stage with her hand until the infant looked.
The infant was briefly presented with the object both
stationary and moving across the stage. The object was
removed from the stage, and the screens were lowered. The
experimenter drew the infant's attention to the spaces
between and on either side of the screens by tapping her hand
until the infant looked.
The objects moved at a rate of about 10 cm/sec, so that
it took about 6 sec to travel the length of the stage once.
The objects were in continuous motion, as in Spelke and
24
Kestenbaum-s experiment (as cited in Xu . Carey, in press)
rather than being stationary for part of the time, as in xl
and Careys (in press) study. For each of the four
conditions, half the infants saw the object start moving from
the left Side, and half saw the object start moving from the
right side. Each infant was presented with four
familiarization trials, each followed by a test trial, ivo
test trials revealed one object behind the screens, and two
test trials revealed two objects. The order of object
presentations was counterbalanced: 1,2,2,1; 2,1,1,2; 1,2,1,2;
2,1,2,1. The side on which the single object was also
counterbalanced between subjects. Each test trial ended when
the infant looked away from the object(s) for 2 consecutive
sec after having looked for at least .5 cumulative sec. The
stage was cleared of objects and screens after each test
trial and before each subsequent familiarization trial.
Continuous-screen Condition
For half the infants in the continuous-screen condition,
the object came out from behind the left screen, moved to the
left end of the stage, then to the right end of the stage,
and back to the left end of the stage. The object traversed
the stage in this manner a total of four times, and its final
position was occluded by the left screen. For the other half
of the infants, the object emerged from and returned to the
right screen. The screens were raised to reveal one or two
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objects. When only one object was revealed, it was behind
the screen where it was last seen. For half the infants,
this was on the left and for half it was on the right.
Discontinuous-screen Gondii- inn
For half the infants, the left object moved first. The
object emerged from behind the left screen, traveled to the
left end of the stage, and traveled back to its position
behind the left screen. There was a pause of about 3 sec
when no objects were visible (the time it would take the
object to travel from the left edge of the left screen to the
right edge of the right screen), followed by the emergence of
the right object from the right screen. This event was
repeated four times, and the last visual contact with an
object was as it was being occluded by the right screen.
When there was only one object displayed in the test trials,
it was on the right. The other half of the infants first saw
the object emerge from the right screen and last saw the
object being occluded by the left screen. When one object
was displayed in the test trials, it was on the left.
Continuous-periphery Condition
For half the infants, the object entered the stage from
the left, traveled across the stage to the right end of the
stage, and back to the left end. This event was repeated
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four times. Except for the beginning and end of each
familiarization trial, in which the object was occluded
because it was off the stage, the object was only occluded by
the screens. At the end of the familiarization trial, the
infant last saw the object leaving the left side of the
stage, when only one object was presented in the test
trials, it was on the left. The other half of the infants
first saw the object enter from the right and last saw it
exit on the right, when only one object was presented in the
test trials, it was on the right.
Discontinuous
-periphery Condition
For half the infants, the object entered the stage from
the left, was occluded by the left screen, and then exited to
the left side of the stage again. After a 3-sec pause, an
object entered the stage on the right, was occluded by the
right screen, and exited the stage to the right. This event
was repeated four times, since the object was last seen on
the right side of the stage, the presentation of one object
in the test trials was on the right. For the other half of
the infants, the object was first seen on the right and last
on the left. When one object was presented in the test
trial, it was on the left.
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Baseline Group
Eight infants (four 5.5- and four lO-month-old infants)
were presented with four baseline trials to determine whether
they had an initial preference for looking at either one or
two objects. All baseline trials began with the stage empty.
The experimenter drew the infant's attention to the empty
stage by tapping the stage with her hand until the infant
looked. The infant was briefly presented with the moving
object on the stage. The object was removed from the stage,
and the screens were lowered. The experimenter drew the
infant's attention to the spaces between and on either side
of the screens by tapping her hand until the infant looked.
The screens were then raised to reveal the object(s).
Two trials revealed one object and two trials revealed two
objects. The order of object presentations was
counterbalanced as in the experimental group. The side of
the presentation of the single object (left or right) was
also counterbalanced. Baseline trials were ended using the
same criteria for trials in the experimental group. The
stage was cleared of screens and objects between each
baseline trial.
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CHAPTER IV
RESULTS
The first observer (RSB) used a video monitor to score
looking times during the experiment. The scores of the first
observer were used in the data analyses. Since the first and
second observers have previously achieved reliability
measures above .98 (see Bogartz, Shinskey & Speaker, 1995),
only 6 of the 40 subjects were rescored by the second
observer (JLS). Interobserver reliability was .977.
Baseline Group
An analysis of variance conducted on the data from the
baseline group included four factors with two levels each.
The variables were age (5.5 or 10 months), number of objects
(one or two), sequence of objects (1,2,2,1; 2,1,1,2; 1,2,1,2;
2,1,2,1), and trial (first or second pair of object
presentations). No main effects or interactions were found.
Infants did not show a significant preference for looking at
two objects over one object.
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Experimental Crnnpo
For the experimental groups, the variables included in
the analysis of variance were age (5.5 or 10 months),
movement (continuous or discontinuous), location of occlusion
(screen or periphery), side of single object (left or right)
number of objects (one or two), sequence of objects (1,2,2,1;
2,1,1,2; 1,2,1,2; 2,1,2,1), and trial pair (first or second
'
pair Of Object presentations). Sequence of objects was
completely confounded with the Movement x Location x Side
interaction. The mean looking times for the four
experimental groups are listed in Table 1 at the end of the
chapter and the analysis of variance is listed in Table 2.
Since the first analysis indicated that the sequence factor
was not involved in any significant effects, the subsequent
analyses excluded sequence as a factor in order to increase
power
.
The Cognitive Processing Hypothesis
Test Trials
The specific predictions and outcomes of the cognitive
processing hypothesis were as follows. First, we expected to
replicate the results of Xu and Carey's two original
conditions, if infants have object permanence knowledge that
can be manifested in this task, they should look longer at
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ect
two Objects in the continuous-screen condition and one obj
in the discontinuous-screen condition. This looking pattern
would have been reflected in a significant Movement x
Location X Number interaction effect. However, no such
effect was found.
Second, according to the cognitive processing
hypothesis, infants should generally look longer during test
trials of periphery events than screen events, since both
periphery outcomes are unlikely, whereas only one screen
outcome is unlikely. This pattern would be revealed by a
significant main effect of location of occlusion. However,
no main effect of location was found.
Third, if 10-month-old infants have more object
permanence knowledge than 5 . 5-month-old infants, it is
possible that only the older infants would look longer at
periphery test trials than screen test trials. This pattern
would be manifested by a significant Age x Location
interaction. No Age x Location interaction occurred;
however, a marginally significant Age x Location x Trial
interaction occurred [F(l,16) = 4.207, p < .057], as may be
seen in Figure 5 at the end of the chapter. Ten-month-old
infants did look longer following the periphery events than
the screen events on the first trial pair, although they
looked about equally on the second trial pair. Five-and-a-
half-month-old infants looked about equally to the periphery
and screen events on both trial pairs, although they looked
longer at the first trial pair than at the second trial pair
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The fourth prediction of the cognitive processing
hypothesis was that infants would look equally at one and two
Objects in the periphery conditions. This pattern would have
been reflected in a significant Movement x Location x Number
interaction, but no interaction occurred.
A fifth, related prediction was that 10-month-old
infants would look equally at one and two objects, although
5.5-month-old infants may not. m this case, a significant
Age X Movement x Location x Number interaction would occur.
An Age x Movement x Location x Number interaction did occur
[F(l,16) = 6.054, p < .026]; however, it does not support the
pattern that was expected, as seen in Figure 6 at the end of
the chapter. Ten-month-old infants looked longer at test
trials following continuous events than discontinuous events,
and they looked longer at two objects than one, regardless of
the location of occlusion (screen or periphery events).
However, 5.5-month-old infants looked about equally at one
and two objects in the discontinuous-screen condition, looked
longer at two objects in the continuous-screen and
discontinuous
-periphery conditions, and looked longer at one
object in the continuous
-periphery condition.
The only pattern predicted by the cognitive processing
hypothesis that was partially, but not significantly,
revealed was for 5.5-month-old infants for the screen
condition on the first trial pair only, as shown in the Age x
Movement x Location x Trial x Number interaction (Figure 7).
However, the pattern is reversed on the second trial pair for
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these infants. Furthermore, the pattern of looking for the
5.5-month-old infants in the periphery events, as well as the
pattern for 10-.onth-old infants in both screen and periphery
events, does not conform to cognitive processing predictions.
Familiarization Trials
The sixth prediction involves looking time during
familiarization trials. Both the continuous
-screen and
discontinuous-screen events are actually impossible events,
infants saw the screens being lowered onto an empty stage,
and immediately following, an object emerged from behind a
screen, since no object was on the stage before the screens
were lowered, this was an impossible event, if infants have
object permanence knowledge, the impossible screen events
should violate their expectations. Infants with object
permanence knowledge should therefore look longer at the
screen events than at the periphery events during the
familiarization trials. An analysis of variance showed a
main effect of location of occlusion. However, the effect
reflected a pattern in the opposite direction: infants
actually looked longer during familiarization to the
periphery events than to the screen events [F(l,16) = 23.386,
p < .000]. One problem with this analysis is that the
periphery events took longer for the experimenter to enact
than the screen events, so that infants had more time to
look. However, infants in the screen events were found to
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spend about 76% of the ti.e looking, whereas infants in the
periphery events spent about 84% of the time looking.
IS
The Perceptual Processing Hypothes
Test Trial
g
The perceptual processing hypothesis shared the same
first prediction as the cognitive processing hypothesis - to
replicate the results of the two original conditions of Xu
and Carey. However, as discussed above, replication did not
occur. No significant Movement x Location x Number
interaction occurred.
The second prediction was that infants would look
equally at screen and periphery events, since infants are not
assumed to know that any object in periphery events is
unlikely. This prediction was confirmed: no main effect of
location of occlusion occurred.
The third prediction was that infants in the continuous
conditions should look longer at two objects, and infants in
the discontinuous conditions should look longer at one
object, as would be reflected by a Movement x Number
interaction. No Movement x Number interaction was found.
However, a Movement x Side x Number interaction was found
[F(l,16) = 4.808, p < .043], as seen in Figure 8 at the end
of the chapter, when the single object was shown on the
right side, infants looked longer at two objects following
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the continuous events. However, when the single object was
Shown on the left side, infants looXed longer at two objects
following the discontinuous events. The meaning of this
interaction is unclear anrf i.,4-i , and interactions involving the side
factor are discussed later in the paper.
Fourth, it was possible that 10-month-old infants might
look longer at two objects in the continuous-screen condition
and one object in the discontinuous-screen condition, but
look equally at one and two objects in the two periphery
conditions, if they have object permanence knowledge. This
prediction, mentioned in a previous section, would have been
reflected in an Age x Movement x Location x Number
interaction with a specific looking pattern. Although an
interaction occurred, the predicted looking pattern was not
reflected in it.
Familiarization Trials
The fifth prediction for the perceptual processing
hypothesis involved looking time on familiarization trials.
Infants without object permanence knowledge would not be
expected to look any longer at screen events during
familiarization than at periphery events, since they are not
expected to realize that the screen familiarization events
are actually impossible. This prediction was confirmed,
since the main effect of location of occlusion for
familiarization trials did not show infants to look longer at
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screen events than periphery events. As mentioned earlier
infants actually looked significantly longer at periphery
'
events [F(1,16) = 23.386, p < .OOO].
ynpredicted Sionifin^n^- p^^^i^^
Test Trials
Many significant results occurred that were not
predicted, since the pattern of these results cannot be
determined by looking at the analysis of variance in Table 2,
they are briefly described here.
infants looked longer on the first pair of test trials
than on the second pair of test trials, as shown by the main
effect of trial [F(l, 16) = 35.047, p < .000] . infants also
looked longer at two objects than at one object [main effect
of number: F(l,16) = 6.105, p < .025]. This was not
expected, given the finding that the baseline group did not
have a significant preference for two objects over one. in
addition, 5.5-month-old infants looked longer at test trials
following discontinuous than continuous events, whereas 10-
month-old infants showed the reverse pattern [Age x Movement
interaction: F(l, 16) = 7.171, p < .016) ] . A marginally
significant Age x Movement x Trial interaction [F(l,16) =
4.121, p < .059] supported the same pattern for the first
trial pair. Finally, infants looked longer at test trials
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following the discontinuous than continuous events on the
first pair of object presentations, but looked longer
following continuous than discontinuous events on the second
pair of object presentations [Movement x Trial interaction:
F(l,16) = 7.984, p < .012].
In addition, many unexpected interactions involving the
side factor were found. The side factor indicates whether
the infant saw the single object in the left or right
location. Five-and-a-half
-month-old infants looked longer on
test trials following the screen events when the single
object was shown on the right side, but looked longer
following the periphery events when the single object was
shown on the left side. Ten-month-old infants, however,
looked longer following the screen events when the single
object was shown on the right, and looked longer following
the periphery events when the single object was shown on the
left [marginally significant Age x Location x Side
interaction: F(l,16) = 4.039, p < .062]. In addition, five-
and-a-half
-month-old infants in the screen events and 10-
month-old infants in the periphery events looked longer at
the first trial pair when the single object was shown on the
left, but did not prefer left or right on the second trial
pair. However, 5 . 5-month-old infants in the periphery events
and 10-month-old infants in the screen events looked longer
at the first trial pair when the single object was shown on
the right, but did not show a preference on the second trial
pair [Age x Location x Side x Trial interaction: F(l,16) =
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8.942, p < .009]. in addition, the Age x Side x Number
interaction [F(1,16) = 4.8O8, p < .043] was significant: 5.5-
month-old infants looked longer at one object when it was on
the right, and longer at two objects when the single object
was on the left. Ten-month-old infants, however, looked
longer at both one and two objects when the single object was
on the right, and generally looked longer at two objects than
one. Finally, the Age x Movement x Side x Number interaction
[F(l,16) = 6.054, p < .026] was also significant: both 5.5-
and 10-month-old infants looked longer at two objects than
one when the single object was shown on the right following
the continuous conditions. However, 5.5-month-old infants in
the discontinuous conditions looked longer at one object than
two when the single object was on the right, and looked
longer at two objects than one when the single object was on
the left. Ten-month-old infants in the discontinuous
conditions looked longer at both one and two objects when the
single object was shown on the left than when it was shown on
the right.
Familiarization Trials
Several unpredicted findings also occurred in the
familiarization trial analysis. Ten-month-old infants spent
more time looking away when the object started from the
right, but 5.5-month-old infants looked away more when the
object started from the left [Age x Side interaction: F(l,16)
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= 6.241, p < .024]. in addition, infants looked longer when
the single object started moving from the left side in the
periphery event, whereas in the screen event, they looked
longer when it started moving from the right side [marginally
significant Location x Side interaction: F(1,16) = 4.049, p <
.061]. Similarly, infants looked about equally during the
continuous-screen and continuous
-periphery conditions whether
the single object started from the left or the right, but
looked longer in the discontinuous
-periphery condition when
the object started from the left, and looked longer in the
discontinuous-screen condition when the object started from
the right [Movement x Location x Side interaction: F(l,16) =
12.382, p < .003].
Additional Analyses
All of the analyses above were performed on infants'
total looking time for each trial, as well as on both the
first and second trial pairs. Additional analyses were
performed on the infants' first look during each trial, as
well as for the first trial pair only. Fewer significant
results were found overall when only the first look and/or
first trial pair were analyzed.
When total looking time was analyzed for the first trial
pair only, the results revealed the same looking patterns as
when both trial pairs were analyzed. However, significance
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iects
level increased or decreased for so^e of these results, ror
example, the marginally significant Age x Location x side
interaction
,p < .062, became significant when only the first
trial pair was analyzed [F(1,16) = 7.310, p < .oi6].
However, the effect of nu^l^r (longer looking at two obj,
than one, with a p < .025, was no longer significant when
only the first trial pair was analyzed [F,l,16) = 2.664, p <
.122],
When only the infants' first looking time (first gaze)
on each trial was analyzed for both trial pairs, some of the
significant results mirrored those found for total looking
time, but some new results occurred. Three of these effects,
one of which was marginally significant, involved the side
factor. Since interpretation of the meaning of the results
involving the side factor is unclear, they will not be
discussed further. The fourth, marginally significant effect
(Location X Trial x Number [F(l,16) = 3.992, p < .063])
supoorted the finding that infants looked longer at two
objects than one for both trial pairs of the periphery
events, but in the screen events, infants looked longer at
two objects on the first trial pair and one object on the
second trial pair. This finding does not support either of
the hypotheses investigated here.
Infants
'
first looking times were also analyzed for the
first trial pair only. Fewer significant results were found
overall. One result mirrored the previous pattern of the Age
X Movement interaction. The second significant finding was a
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new result, but involved the side f^ni-r.r- . ^uu a tacto and so cannot be
meaningfully interpreted here.
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Table 1
Mean looking tixnes to one and two objects as a function of
age, movement, location and side
Trial 1
Group
Continuous
-periphery
Continuous-screen
Discontinuous
-periphery
Discontinuous
-screen
Trial 2
No 1 No 2 No 1 No 2
5.5 month olds (n = 16)
L 13.950 8.400 6.700 4.817
R 4.633 4.608 9.833 8.158
L 8.650 4.558 4.267 3.225
R 3.833 29.958 10.892 3.933
L 8.967 43.200 6.583 9.908
R 21.692 20.308 9.317 5.175
L 9.308 28.808 5.000 7.817
R 41.092 10.200 3.825 9.383
Continued, next page
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Table 1 continued
Continuous
-
periphery
Continuous-screen
Discontinuous-periphery
Discontinuous
-screen
10 month olds (n = 16)
L 9.542 15.083 10.425 12.892
R 24.508 31.217 5.425 17.808
L 18.542 14.283 14.500 14.958
R 10.600 10.650 5.808 15.775
L 8.100 13.967 5.717 9.433
R 27.242 23.425 7.625 7.992
L 8.375 9.925 3.125 6.508
R 6.375 14.100 4.600 13.325
Note. Looking times are in sec.
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Table 2
Analysis of variance of looking times
Source df MS
Between subjects
F
Age (A)
^ 29.471 0.230
Movement (M) i 71.950 0.556
Location of occlusion (L) i 114.194 0.882
Side of single object (S) i 170.124 1.314
A X M 2 928.266 **7.171
A X L I 103.141 0.797
A X S I 25.235 0.195
M X L I 34.688 0.268
M X S I 2.042 0.016
L X S I 2.411 0.019
A X M X L 1 0.203
A X M X S 1 71.551 0.553
A X L X S 1 522.857 *4.039
M X L X S 1 16.603 0.128
AxMxLxS 1 51.723 0.400
S within-group error 16 129.438
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Table 2 continued
Trial pair (T)
T X A
T X M
T X L
T X S
T X A X M
T X A X L
T X A X S
T X M X L
T X M X S
T X L X S
T X A X M X L
T X A X M X S
T X A X L X S
T X M X L X S
TxAxMxLxS
T X S within-group error
Within subjects
16
1850.601
125.281
421.588
46.843
71.351
217.622
222.166
81.973
15.657
.940
7.363
15.703
8.422
472.141
3.955
4.896
52.803
****35.047
2.373
**7.984
0.887
1.351
*4.121
*4.207
1.552
0.297
0.018
0.139
0.297
0.159
***8.942
0.075
0.093
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Table 2 continued
Number of objects (N)
N X A
N X M
N X L
N X S
N X A X M
N X A X L
N X A X S
N X M X L
N X M X S
N X L X S
N X A X M X L
N X A X M X S
N X A X L X S
N X M X L X S
NxAxMxLxS
N X S within-group error 16
280.549
22.641
10.484
9.589
43.517
27.969
1.221
220.938
15.240
676.967
53.260
278.185
278.185
5.514
0.054
63.141
45.941
**6.105
0.493
0.228
0.209
0.947
0.609
0.027
**4.808
0.332
****14.732
1.159
**6.054
**6.054
0.120
0.001
1.374
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laDle 2 continued
T X N
12.272 0.236
T X N X A
128.067 2.461
T X N X M
0.096 0.002
T X N X L
36.587 0.703
T X N X S
109.829 2.111
T X N X A X M 21.918 0.421
T X N X A X L 2.284 0.044
T X N X A X S 12.984 0.250
T X N X M X L 172.283 3.311
T X N X M X S 408.146 **7.845
T X N X L X S 8.559 0.165
T Y M A A X M X Jj 292.316 **5.618
T X N X A X M X S 537 .783 X U . O J o
T X N X A X L X S 0 745
T X N X M X L X S 85.097 1.636
T X N X A X M X L X S 110.323 2.120
T X N X S within-group 16 52.028
error
Note. Looking times are in sec. S = subjects. *g_ < 0.10.
**E < 0.05. < 0.01. < .001.
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CHAPTER V
DISCUSSION
Although recent evidence has been interpreted as
revealing cognitive processing of occluded objects by young
infants, we believe a more parsimonious view involving
perceptual processing may account for some results. The
present experiment was designed to differentiate between the
cognitive processing and perceptual processing hypotheses
concerning infants' representations of the number of objects
involved in an occlusion event.
Xu and Carey concluded that the 10-month-old infants in
their study used spatiotemporal information to infer the
number of objects involved in the events. After being
familiarized with a discontinuous-screen event involving two
objects, infants looked longer at test trials that revealed
only one object. After familiarization with a continuous-
screen event involving only one object, most infants looked
longer at two objects during test trials. Xu and Carey
concluded that 10-month-old infants know that an object
cannot exist in two places without existing in the
intervening space and time, and they use this information to
infer that there are two objects in the discontinuous-screen
event. Similarly, most of the infants represent the smooth,
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continuous path of tho t-m,F«n i e oy m the continuous-screen event as
inlying that only one object is present.
we believe that a sUnpler explanation may account for
these results. The perceptual processing perspective
proposes that the presentation of two discrete bundles of
activity during famliarization with the discontinuous-screen
event contrasts perceptually with the presentation of one
Object on test trials and captures the infant's attention.
Simlarly, the smoother tracking in familiarization with the
continuous
-screen event contrasts with the back-and-forth
looking at two objects on test trials and causes the infant
to look longer.
we attempted to replicate Xu and Carey's results, and to
test the perceptual processing perspective by presenting
infants with two additional periphery events. The periphery
events were perceptually similar to the two original screen
conditions. There were two bundles of activity at either end
of the stage in both the discontinuous-screen and
discontinuous-periphery events. In the continuous
-screen and
continuous
-periphery events, one object traveled in a smooth
path across the stage and back. However, in the periphery
events, no objects were left behind the screens at the end of
familiarization, and therefore no objects should have been
revealed when the screens were raised. Infants who have
object permanence knowledge and who can use spatiotemporal
information to infer number should look equally long at one
and two objects, since both outcomes are unexpected. They
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Should also loo. longer in the periphery conditions than in
the screen conditions, since the presence o, any objects is
unexpected.
we tested 10-month-old infants in order to replicate the
original study, we tested 5
.5-.onth-old infants because we
are not convinced that infants of this age have attained the
object concept, although we would not be surprised if 10-
month-old infants have. Much of the recent evidence on
physical knowledge in infancy is interpreted as showing that
infants as young as 3 or 4 months of age have object
permanence knowledge. Although the 5.5-month-old infants may
not show the same looking patterns as the 10-month-old
infants (using spatiotemporal information to infer number),
they should look longer at test trials in the periphery
events than in the screen events if they have object
permanence knowledge.
The Cognitive Processing Hypothesis
The specific predictions of the cognitive processing
hypothesis were as follows. 1) The original findings would
be replicated: infants would look longer at one object in the
discontinuous-screen condition and two objects in the
continuous-screen condition. 2) Infants would generally look
longer in the periphery conditions than in the screen
conditions. 3) Ten-month-old infants, but not 5.5-month-old
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infants ^gnt loo. longer in periphery than screen conditions
If they have more object permanence knowledge than the
younger infants. 4, infants would look equally long at one
and two Objects in the periphery conditions, since both
outcomes are impossible. 5) Ten-month-old but not 5.5-month-
old infants may look equally at one and two objects in the
periphery conditions for the san. reason given above. 6, On
familiarization trials, infants, especially lO-month-old
infants, would look longer at screen events than periphery
events, since the screen condition actually involves an
impossible event.
The cognitive processing hypothesis was not supported by
the results of this study. First, Xu and Carey's results
were not replicated, and this calls into question the
robustness of their findings. This finding is additionally
important because Xu & Carey's Experiment 1 was the
foundation for the remaining experiments discussed in their
paper, if the results of Experiment 1 cannot be replicated,
the experiments which followed may be questioned. One
qualification that must be added, however, is that our
procedure was not identical to Xu and Carey's. Xu and Carey
allowed the objects to remain stationary for part of the time
during familiarization, in order to accommodate the 5.5-
month-old infants in our study, we kept the objects in motion
throughout familiarization, it is possible that the novelty
of seeing stationary objects for the first time during test
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trials may have changed the looking pattern that infants
would otherwise have shown.
in terms of the replication prediction, then, infants,
even 10-.onth-olds, did not looK longer at one object in the
discontinuous-screen condition and two objects in the
continuous-screen condition. Second, infants did not look
longer in the periphery conditions than in the screen
conditions. Five-and-a-half
-month-old infants actually
looked longer in the screen conditions than in the periphery
conditions. Regarding the third prediction, however, a
marginal effect supported the finding that 10-month-old
infants on the first trial pair only looked longer in the
periphery conditions than in the screen conditions (Figure
5). This effect disappeared in the second trial pair,
however
.
Regarding the fourth prediction, infants did not look
equally long at one and two objects in the periphery events.
Five-and-a-half-month-old infants looked longer at two
objects in the discontinuous-periphery condition and slightly
longer at one object in the continuous-periphery condition
(Figure 6). Ten-month-old infants looked slightly longer at
two objects in both periphery events, so the fifth prediction
regarding the 10-month-infants was not confirmed either.
The only looking pattern, although not significant, that
seemed to conform to the predictions of the cognitive
processing hypothesis was that of the 5 .5-month-old infants
in the original continuous-screen and discontinuous-screen
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conditions for the firct- ^-rA^^rst trial pair only (Figure 7). m this
case, the 5.5-month-old infants did look longer at one
Object in the discontinuous-screen condition and two objects
in the continuous-screen condition. However, that pattern
reversed itself in the second test trial pair, and was not
exhibited by 10-month-old infants, m addition, the 5.5-
month-old infants did not look equally at one and two objects
in the periphery conditions, as would be predicted by the
cognitive processing hypothesis.
One last prediction of the cognitive processing
hypothesis involved looking times on familiarization trials
rather than test trials. The screen events are actually
impossible because the infants see the screens being lowered
onto an empty stage and then immediately see an object emerge
from behind one of the screens. The cognitive processing
hypothesis would predict that infants with object permanence
knowledge would generally spend more time looking at the
screen events than the periphery events during
familiarization. This was not the case, however. Infants
actually looked longer during familiarization to the
periphery events than to the screen events.
Although we were somewhat surprised that we did not
replicate Xu and Carey's original findings, the fact that the
predictions of the cognitive processing hypothesis were not
fulfilled in this study further corroborates our doubts about
claims that young infants mentally represent hidden objects
and can use spatiotemporal information to infer number.
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Failure to support the cognitive processing hypothesis in
this study lends credence to the hypothesis that results like
these may be better explained by an alternative view; we
expect, the perceptual processing hypothesis. However,
failure to replicate the original results complicates any
arguments for the perceptual processing view. The periphery
events were designed specifically around the original events,
and our predictions about the periphery results were based on
the assumption of replication. The predictions of the
perceptual processing hypothesis for this study were not
fulfilled. We were not able to clearly differentiate the
cognitive and perceptual processing hypotheses in this study.
The Perceptual Processing Hvpothesis
The specific predictions of the perceptual processing
hypothesis for this study were as follows. 1) We predicted
replication of the results in the two original conditions,
but for perceptual rather than cognitive reasons . 2
)
Infants, especially 5 . 5-month-old infants were expected to
look equally at the screen and periphery events, since it is
not assumed that they have object permanence knowledge. 3)
However, we would not have been surprised if 10-month-old
infants exhibited object permanence knowledge by looking
longer in the periphery conditions than the screen
conditions. 4) Infants were expected to show the same
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looking pattern at one and two objects in the periphery
conditions as in the screen conditions: infants should look
longer at two objects in the continuous periphery condition
and longer at one object in the discontinuous-periphery
condition, for perceptual reasons. 5) if lO-month-old
infants have greater object permanence knowledge than 5.5-
month-old infants, they may look equally at one and two
objects in the periphery conditions, rather than showing the
above pattern. 6) infants were expected not to look longer
during familiarization with the screen events than the
periphery events.
The first prediction was not fulfilled, xu and Carey's
results were not replicated. The second prediction, however,
was confirmed. Infants of both ages looked equally at the
screen and periphery events. However, the third prediction
was marginally disconfirmed. A marginal effect supported the
finding that 10-month-old infants looked longer in the
periphery than in the screen condition.
The fourth and fifth predictions were not fulfilled.
Infants, even 10-month-old infants, did not look longer at
two objects in the continuous-periphery condition and one
object in the discontinuous
-periphery condition. However,
infants did not even show that looking pattern for the
original conditions, which clouds our interpretation. We
would have been harder pressed to explain this result if the
original results had been replicated. However, our other
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results are not strongly indicative of object permanence
knowledge, even among the 10-month-old infants.
The sixth prediction was confirmed, infants with object
permanence knowledge should have looked longer during
familiarization with the screen events than the periphery
events, but they did not.
Unpredicted Significant Results
Several significant results occurred which were not
predicted. An Age x Movement interaction indicated that 10-
month-old infants on average spent more time looking at test
trials following the continuous events than those following
the discontinuous events, whereas 5.5-month-old infants
showed the reverse pattern. We might have expected that the
discontinuous events might in general be intrinsically more
interesting and generate greater attention across
familiarization and test trials, since there are two separate
bundles of activity at which to look back and forth.
However, this only explains the 5.5-month-old infants'
pattern and not that of the 10-month-old infants.
All of the significant interactions involving the side
factor were unexpected. The side factor was added only to
counterbalance the side on which the single object was shown.
In addition, the single object on the test trials was always
shown on the same side on which it was last seen during
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familiarization, so it cannot be that the infant expected to
see the object on the other side. Our initial speculation
was that the effect involving the side factor had to do with
the mother's presence on the infant's right side. We would
not have been surprised if the infant looked away more often
while an object was on the right side of the stage, since the
infant looked more at the mother when his or her head was
oriented to the right. However, the distance between the
right and left object was only about 15 cm, and the pattern
of results does not conform to the pattern this explanation
would predict. Infants sometimes spent more time looking
away during test trials on which the single object was on the
left, rather than on the right. For example, see the
Movement x Side x Number interaction in Figure 8. Infants
looked longer at two objects than one in the discontinuous
events only when the single object was presented on the left.
However, they looked longer at two than one in the
continuous-events only when the single object was on the
right
.
We were surprised that the side factor had any effect at
all, much less an effect so great that p < .001 in the case
of the Movement x Side x Number interaction in Figure 8. We
do not know how to interpret the many interactions involving
the side factor. In some cases, the results seemed to
support one hypothesis or the other, but only when the object
was on a particular side. For example, in the marginally
significant Age x Location x Side interaction, 10-month-old
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infants looked longer following the periphery events, as
predicted by the cognitive processing hypothesis, but only
when the single object was on the left, since the side
factor is not a psychologically meaningful one, we cannot
interpret any of the results in which it is involved as
supporting either hypothesis.
Conclusions
Our general conclusions, then, are as follows. The
findings of Xu and Carey were not robust enough to be
replicated in this study. The predictions of the cognitive
processing hypothesis were not fulfilled in this study, we
are not convinced that infants can and do use spatiotemporal
information to infer number, nor are we convinced that
infants exhibit object permanence knowledge in this task.
The perceptual processing hypothesis fared somewhat
better than the cognitive processing hypothesis in that some
of its predictions were fulfilled. Infants did not indicate
that their expectations were violated when objects in the
periphery events were revealed where none should have been.
Furthermore, infants did not look longer during
familiarization when an object emerged from behind a screen,
where no objects were before the screens were lowered.
However, the main prediction that infants would look longer
at two objects in the continuous-periphery condition and one
object in the discontinuous-periphery condition was not
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fulfilled, we do not believe the perceptual processing
hypothesis has failed, however, since the original results
were not replicated. We generally conclude that lack of
replication has made the results of this study particularly
difficult to interpret, and that this specific experimental
design was not well-suited for clearly discriminating the
cognitive and perceptual processing hypotheses with regard to
infants' representations of occlusion events.
we are applying a new design in our lab called the Event
Set X Event Set design (see Bogartz et al., 1995), which has
already supported the perceptual processing hypothesis in one
experiment, and which we are currently using in two
additional experiments. Many studies of infants'
representations use the two-test design, in which infants are
habituated to an event and are then tested on a possible
event and an impossible event. Since the perceptual
processing view suggests that infants' looking time on these
possible and impossible events may be due to other factors,
particularly the perceptual differences between habituation
and test events, the Event Set x Event Set paradigm was
designed to determine what these other factors might be. In
this design, three groups of infants are habituated to the
three original events (habituation, possible and impossible),
and then each infant is tested on all three events.
Furthermore, the multiple regression analysis used with this
design is better able to pick out the specific elements of
the events that influence infants' looking time. It is more
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specific than an analysis of variance. „e are hopeful that
the results obtained with this design will support our belief
that many previous results iiaplying cognitive processing of
occluded objects in young infants can be explained by
invoking lower-level perceptual processing.
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